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THE STATUS OF TRUST FUNDS AS CLAIMS
AGAINST INSOLVENT BANKS
AGNES M. KASPER'
A CLAIM against an insolvent bank is usually predi-
cated upon a deposit of some kind. It is generally
understood that there are two possible types of deposits
in a bank, namely, general and special. A general deposit
is one which is made to the credit of the depositor and
upon which he may draw from time to time in the usual
course of business. Deposits are usually presumed to be
general in the absence of any agreement indicating a con-
trary intent,' and the relation of debtor and creditor
arises between the parties. In the event of the insolvency
of a bank, the general depositors share equally in the
assets of the bank after the prior and preferred claims
have been satisfied in accordance with the orders of the
court having jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding.
A special deposit is one made under circumstances
which in and of themselves create a fiduciary relationship
between the parties rather than the usual debtor and
creditor arrangement.' Circumstances which cause the
relation of bailor and bailee, principal and agent, or
trustee and cestui que trust to arise between the bank and
its depositor, as a general rule, are sufficient to support a
claim that a deposit made thereunder is a special one.4
1 Member of Illinois Bar; alumna of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 The People v. Home State Bank, 338 Ill. 179, 170 N. E. 205 (1930)
Bayor v. American Trust and Savings Bank, Assignee, 157 Ill. 62, 41 N. E.
622 (1895).
3 People, ex rel. Nelson v. State Bank of Maywood et al., 354 Ill. 519, 188
N. E. 853 (1933); People ex rel. Russell, Auditor of Public Accounts v.
Farmers State & Savings Bank of Grant Park, 338 Ill. 134, 170 N. E. 236
(1930) ; Pitts v. Pease et al., 39 F. (2d) 14 (1930) ; Anderson v. The Pacific
Bank, 112 Cal. 598, 44 P. 1063 (1896).
4 People ex rel. Russell, Auditor of Public Accounts v. Farmers State and
Savings Bank of Grant Park, 338 Ill. 134, 170 N. E. 236 (1930) ; Woodhouse
v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902) ; Mutual Accident Assn. of the
Northwest v. Jacobs, Assignee, 141 Ill. 261, 31 N. E. 414 (1892) ; Wetherell,
Assignee v. O'Brien, 140 Ill. 146, 29 N. E. 904 (1892); People ex rel.
Andrew Russell, Auditor of Public Accounts v. Iuka State Bank, 229 Ill.
App. 4 (1922) ; Pitts v. Pease et al., 39 F. (2d) 14 (1930).
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Special deposits are entitled to preferential treatment in
the liquidation of the affairs of an insolvent bank, but
clear and satisfactory proof of the existence of circum-
stances out of which a special or fiduciary relationship of
any sort might arise must be produced. 5
PRIOR AND PREFERRED CLAIMS
Prior and preferred claims are terms frequently used
interchangeably, but they are by no means synonymous.
Prior claims are those claims for which the legislature
has created a statutory preference against the assets of
an insolvent bank regardless of an obligation to establish
the existence of a fiduciary relationship in connection
therewith or to trace a particular fund into the hands of
the receiver. Wage claims,8 certain moneys due to the
United States government on deposit in state banks,' and
funds of the state' are a few of the claims granted a
priority in Illinois.
Preferred claims, however, after they have been proved
to be such, are entitled to preferential treatment only to
the extent that the proceeds of the fund on which the
claim is based can be traced into the hands of the re-
ceiver. Proof of the existence of a trust relationship be-
tween the bank and a depositor is only the first step in
obtaining a preferred claim.
The necessity for tracing the proceeds of a deposit
based on a fiduciary relationship is predicated on the
very natural situation of an owner seeking the return
5 Marble v. Marble's Estate, 304 Ill. 229, 136 N. E. 589 (1922) ; Roth v.
Michalis et al., 125 Ill. 325, 17 N. E. 809 (1888) ; Fralick v. Coeur d' Alene
Bank and Trust Co., 36 Ida. 108, 210 P. 586 (1922) ; In re Cooper County
State Bank, 67 S. W. (2d) 109 (Mo. App., 1933).
6 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 82, par. 63; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 72, par. 1.
7 U. S. R. S., sec. 3466; 31 U. S. C. A., sec. 191.
8 People v. Bank of Rushville, 355 Ill. 336, 189 N. E. 299 (1934) ; People
v. West Englewood Trust and Savings Bank, 353 Ill. 451, 187 N. E. 525
(1933); People v. Dime Savings Bank, 350 Ill. 503, 183 N. E. 604 (1932) ;
People v. Marion Trust and Savings Bank, 347 Ill. 445, 179 N. E. 893
(1932); People v. Bank of Chebanse, 340 Ill. 124, 172 N. E. 50 (1930);
People v. Farmers State Bank, 335 Ill. 617, 167 N. E. 804 (1929).
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of his property from another in whose cus.tody he had
placed it, but to whom beneficial ownership has never
passed. It follows, therefore, that it is necessary for the
claimant to identify his property, or the proceeds thereof,
and show that it is still in the possession of the bank and
has not been dissipated.9 Where the property constituting
the trust fund is capable of identification and remains
intact, it should be immediately surrendered to the cestui
que trust,"0 or where the bank has converted the original
trust res into other property which, however, can be iden-
tified, that other property can be recovered by the cestui
que trust." However, where the property constituting
the original trust res has been mingled with the assets of
the bank and is incapable of identification and can not be
traced, in its altered form, as the proceeds of the trust
res, a real and sometimes insurmountable difficulty
arises.
The theory behind the tracing of trust funds is that
the beneficial ownership of the trust res never passed to
the bank, and it could not, therefore, become a part of the
assets thereof which passed into the hands of the receiver,
but must be returned immediately to the rightful owner.
In the earliest decisions on this point it was held that
any commingling of the proceeds of the trust res with the
general assets of the bank defeated the trust and gave the
cestui que trust only a general claim against the assets of
the bank, because the commingling rendered the trust res
incapable of identification, and because money was not
ear-marked and could not be recovered in specie.12
9 People ex rel. Nelson v. State Bank of Maywood, 354 Ill. 519, 188 N. E.
853 (1933) ; Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707, 58 L. Ed. 807 (1914) ;
First Nat. Bank of Ventura v. Williams, 15 F. (2d) 585 (1926); Farmers'
Nat. Bank of Burlington et al. v. Pribble, 15 F. (2d) 175 (1926); Jones v.
Chesebrough et al., 105 Iowa 303, 75 N. W. 97 (1898).
10 Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902).
11 Ibid.; Union Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Goetz et al., 138 Ill. 127, 27 N. E.
907 (1891).
12 Lanterman v. Travous, 174 Ill. 459, 51 N. E. 805 (1898).
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This rule, however, was modified to a certain extent by
the decision in the case of Woodhouse v. Crandall,"3 in
which it was held that, if the trust res be moneys, it is not
essential that the money or bank bills should be identified
because the suit is not to recover a specific thing but a
certain sum of money held in trust and it is the identity
of the fund and not the identity of the money which is to
be established. It was also held that it makes no differ-
ence if the fund was mingled with other moneys so as to
lose its identity as currency, as the character of the fund
held by the bank in a fiduciary capacity has not been
changed by being placed with other moneys; and further
that where moneys are so mingled, the law will presume
that the trustees draw out their own money first. How-
ever, if it can be shown that the entire fund was with-
drawn or actually dissipated so that none of it remains,
the rule would necessarily be different; if the fund has
once been disposed of, no charge can be made against the
general estate to the exclusion of other creditors.14
It is the generally accepted rule that where moneys are
blended in an account which has been reduced from time
to time by withdrawals, the presumption is that the sums
withdrawn are from the moneys which the trustee had a
right to use and the sums remaining include the trust
fund which he had no right to use. However, this pre-
sumption is rebuttable by evidence to the contrary, and
if at any time during the existence of the mingled account,
the balance remaining therein is less than the trust
money, the trust fund will be regarded as having been
dissipated, except as to the balance remaining, and no
's 197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902).
14 Hauk v. Van Ingen, 196 Ill. 20, 63 N. E. 705 (1902) ; Estate of Seiter
v. Mowe, 182 Ill. 351, 55 N. E. 526 (1899) ; Lanterman v. Travous, 174 Ill.
459, 51 N. E. 805 (1898) ; Bayor v. American Trust and Savings Bank, 157
Ill. 62, 41 N. E. 622 (1895) ; Wetherell v. O'Brien, 140 Ill. 146, 29 N. E. 904
(1892).
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trust may attach to any subsequent deposits. 15 The fore-
going is based on the well settled theory of the law which
refuses to presume that a trustee will perform his duties
in any other manner than a faithful and honest one until
contradictory proof thereof is produced, but he cannot
remove the evidence of his defalcation by replacing the
funds which he had no right to use.
In the case of People v. State Bank of Maywood,18 the
Illinois Supreme Court, in keeping with the trend of the
times, discussed the tracing of trust funds, and said:
The true owner of a fund wrongfully withheld by anotlier has
a right to have it restored, not as a debt due and owing, but
because it is the property of the former. A change or alteration
in the nature or character of the fund does not affect the relation
existing between the parties. Since the right to reclaim a trust
fund is founded on the right of property, and not on the ground
of compensation for its loss, the beneficiary must be able to point
out the particular property into which the fund has been con-
verted. When he is unable to do so, the trust fails and his claim
becomes one for compensation only and stands on the same basis
as the claims of general creditors. It is as necessary to trace the
proceeds of a check or draft constituting part of a trust fund, as
it is to trace the proceeds of any other species of personal prop-
erty; and a trust fund traced into a bank account, if its identity
can be established, and no superior rights of innocent parties
have intervened, will be held for the benefit of the cestui que
trust. The question in every case where it is sought to trace trust
-property is whether it can be identified in its original or altered
form.
The foregoing rule, as laid down in the Bank of May-
wood case, would seem to change the rule as to the trac-
ing of trust funds as established in Illinois by requiring
a more specific tracing of the trust res, or the proceeds
thereof, into specific assets in the hands of the receiver,
namely, the cash on hand and the cash on deposit in other
15 Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879) ; Central Nat. Bank
of Baltimore v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693
(1881) ; Smith v. Mottley, 150 F. 266 (1906) ; Board of Com'rs of Crawford
County v. Strawn, 157 F. 49 (1907).
16 354 Ill. 519, 188 N. E. 853 (1933).
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banks, rather than into the mass of assets, after a show-
ing that they have been augmented by the addition of the
trust res, or its proceeds.
It has been frequently held in Illinois that where an
attempt is being made to trace property or money into
a specific fund, it is essential to show that the property
or money actually augmented the assets in the hands of
the receiver in some way so that the preferred claim may
be satisfied therefrom without affecting the rights of
other creditors.
The Federal courts have followed the same theory on
augmentation as is followed in Illinois, but they have fur-
ther held that where it appears that the trust fund has
been completely withdrawn or dissipated so that no por-
tion thereof remains in the bank, there can be no prefer-
ence against the general assets of the bank. The pre-
sumption that the trust fund came into the hands of the
receiver is rebutted by a showing that the fund had been
dissipated subsequent to its deposit.1" A transfer of funds
by. bookkeeping entries, without any actual segregation,
has been held not to amount to an augmentation of the
assets of a bank, but to consist merely of a shifting of
credits."8
TRUST FUNDS
A discussion of trust funds and their status as a prefer-
ential claim against the receivership estate of an in-
17 People v. State Bank of Maywood, 354 Ill. 519, 188 N. E. 853 (1933);
Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902); People ex rel.
Nelson v. Bates, 351 11. 439, 184 N. E. 597 (1933) ; In re People v. Illiana
State Bank, 265 Ill. App. 29 (1932) ; People ex rel. Russell v. Auburn State
Bank et al., 215 Ill. App. 133 (1919) ; Miller v. Viola State Bank, 121 Kan.
193, 246 P. 517 (1926) ; Murray v. North Liberty Savings Bank, 196 Iowa
729, 195 N. W. 354 (1923); Hansen v. Roush, 139 Iowa 58, 116 N. W. 1061
(1908) ; People v. West Englewood Trust & Savings Bank, 253 Ill. 451, 187
N. E. 525 (1933) : Covey v. Cannon, 104 Ark. 550, 149 S. W. 514 (1912) ;
Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 91 N. E. 332 (1910) ; City of Lincoln v.
Morrison, 64 Neb. 822. 90 N. W. 905 (1902).
18 Thompson v. Common School District No. 54, 67 F. (2d) 284 (1933);
Mechanics' & Metals Nat. Bank of New York v. Buchanan, 12 F. (2d) 891
(1926) ; State Bank of Winfield v. Alva Security Bank et al., 232 F. 847
(1916); Beard v. Independent District of Pella City, 88 F. 375 (1898).
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solvent bank seems naturally to divide itself into two
general classes, each of which must be considered and
treated separately. The first class includes pure trust
deposits, such as deposits under an express declaration
of trust, bailments, or cases in which the bank is acting
as executor, administrator, guardian, or conservator of
an estate, or as an escrow agent; and the second class
includes those deposits which, because of the circum-
stances surrounding either their acceptance or treatment
by the bank, are held to be trust funds, such as deposits
of state funds, deposits under order of court, and the
like. In the latter class will be included a consideration
of various classes of claims for which there has been a
repeated but unsuccessful effort to establish a preference.
EXPRESS TRUST DEPOSITS
A trust fund has been defined as "a fund held by a
trustee for the specific purposes of the trust,"1 9 but in
order to establish the existence of such a fund it is neces-
sary to establish first of all the existence of a trust rela-
tionship between the parties. Under ordinary circum-
stances when one person holds the property of another
without having any claim thereto, it is not, usually, an
extremely difficult matter to obtain its return to its
rightful owner, but in the case of a deposit of funds in a
bank, special circumstances must be shown to rebut the
presumption that the relation created between the parties
by such deposit was not the generally accepted relation
of debtor and creditor.20 It is necessary, therefore, to
show that funds on deposit were delivered or deposited
for a specific purpose or with a specific understanding
as to their treatment in order to establish the existence of
the fiduciary relationship between the bank and its depos-
itor which necessarily arises on account of such a deposit.
19 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1762.
20 Sachs v. Sachs, 181 Ill. App. 342 (1913).
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In cases in which the bank is acting as trustee, ex-
ecutor, administrator, guardian, or conservator, or where
a written declaration of trust has been executed by the
bank and the depositor setting forth the special circum-
stances of the deposit, it is well settled that in the event
of the insolvency of the bank, claims founded on such
funds are entitled to preferential payment. On that point
it has been held that money which a bank holds as trustee
is not a part of its assets,21 nor legally subject to the
claims of its creditors, and the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals, in the case of Flint Road Cart Co. v. Stephens,22
said:
* . . a trust fund received in such a manner that the ordinary
relation of debtor and creditor is not established, should properly
be returned intact, either by the insolvent bank or by the receiver
subsequently appointed.
In order to establish a preferential claim based on a
trust fund, however, one thing more is necessary-the
fund must be traced into the assets of the bank and must
be shown to have augmented such assets when they came
into -. hands of the receiver. A bank has no authority
to mingle a special deposit or trust account with its gen-
eral assets or funds, and so long as the owner or depos-
itor of such funds can show that he had no knowledge of
and did not authorize the commingling, he can trace his
funds while they are capable of identification. The right
to a preferred claim on account of a special or trust de-
posit ceases only when the means for ascertaining the
identity of the deposit or fund comprising such deposit
fails.
In the case of Union National Bank of Chicago v. Goetz
et al.,23 the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the rule
21 People v. West Englewood Trust and Savings Bank, 353 111. 451, 187
N. E. 525 (1933).
22 32 Mo. App. 341 (1888).
23 138 I1. 127, 27 N. E. 907 (1891).
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laid down in Thompson's Appeal24 by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, and quoted therefrom as follows:
"Whenever a trust fund has been wrongfully converted into an-
other species of property, if its identity can be traced it will be
held, in its new form, liable to the rights of the cestui que trust.
No change of its state and form can divest it of such trust. So
long as it can be identified, either as an original property of the
cestui que trust or as the product of it, equity will follow it, and
the right of reclamation attaches to it until detached by the supe-
rior equity of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice. The substitute for the original thing follows the
nature of the thing itself, so long as it can be ascertained to be
such; but the right of pursuing it fails when the means of ascer-
tainment fail."
Again in the case of Woodhouse v. Crandall,5 the court
said:
So long as it can be identified, either as the original property of
the cestui que trust or as a product of it, equity will follow it,
and the right to reclaim it fails only when the means of ascer-
taining its identity fails.
In the case of People v. State Bank of Maywood, al-
ready referred to, the court, after citing the rule as laid
down in Union National Bank of Chicago v. Goetz, said:
It follows that a receiver of a bank in which a fund impressed
with a trust was deposited cannot be required to re-pay it in
preference to the claims of general creditors, unless the trust
fund can be identified, or traced into some other specific fund or
property.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that pure trust
funds have a preferential status as a claim against the
assets of an insolvent bank only after their identity as
such has been established and traced into the assets in
the hands of a receiver appointed for the purpose of
liquidating the bank, and this applies not only to moneys
deposited for a specific purpose or trust, but to other
property as well.
24 22 Pa. St. 16 (1853), erroneously cited in the Illinois case as 27 Pa.
St. 16.
25 197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902).
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DEPOSITS BY FmuciAmEs
It does not follow, however, that deposits by a person
acting in a fiduciary capacity are prima facie entitled to
preferential treatment. The mere fact that a deposit is
made in the name of an individual as "trustee," "admin-
istrator," "executor," or "guardian" does not alter the
character of the deposit itself, unless some special agree-
ment or arrangement is made with the bank. The test
in such cases is whether a fiduciary relation has been
established between the bank and the depositor, not the
relation between the depositor and his fund and third
persons. The fact that a depositor is acting in a fiduciary
capacity with reference to his funds on deposit in a bank
does not entitle him to any preference, but simply renders
the bank a debtor to him in the particular capacity in
which he has made his deposit.26
On this point the Supreme Court of Missouri, in its
decision in the case of Paul v. Draper,27 said:
The fact that the deposit was of a trust fund, and known to the
bank to be such, would not of itself make the bank a trustee of
the fund for thle benefit of the, cestui que trmst. In- order to have
that effect there must have been something in the circumstances
of the deposit to constitute it a special, as contradistinguished
from a general, deposit, into which two classes all deposits in com-
mercial banks may be divided. If the deposit belonged to the
former class, the fiduciary relation might well arise; if to the
latter, in the absence of mala tides, it could not do so, for by a
general deposit in good faith the title to the deposit passed, the
bank became the owner thereof. The relation of debtor and cred-
itor, and not that of trustee and cestui que trust, was created.
It has also been held that the deposit of court funds in
the hands of a clerk of a particular court in a bank desig-
nated by the court is not, as such, entitled to a preference
26 People v. Home State Bank, 338 Ill. 179, 170 N. E. 205 (1930) ; People
ex rel. Nelson v. Chicago Bank of Commerce, 275 Ill. App. 80 (1934) ; Peo-
ple v. Farmers State Bank, 338 Ill. 134, 170 N. E. 236 (1930) ; Bridge v.
First Nat. Bank-Detroit et al., 5 F. Supp. 442 (1933).
27 158 Mo. 197, 59 S. W. 77, 81 Am. St. Rep. 296 (1900).
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in the absence of some special agreement between the
bank and the depositor regardless of the fact that the bank
and its officers were aware of the source of the funds
being placed on deposit. In the case of Otis v. Gloss,28
which is the leading case in Illinois on this particular
point, the court said:
The mere fact that this was a fund in court does not give the
claim of the court a preference over other just claims. It may be
a misfortune and a great hardship that the money was deposited
in this institution, but it is equally so that the other creditors
were so unfortunate as to repose confidence in dishonest or in-
competent men, and deposit their means with them.
However, where it appears that the funds were depos-
ited under some special and definite agreement or ar-
rangement with the bank sufficient to take the deposit
out of the class of general deposits or where it appears
that the bank was specifically appointed by order of
court to act either as a depositary or in a representative
capacity, the rule is different.
Deposits of funds under express order of court have
been held to be trust funds, and in the case of People v.
Citizens Trust and Savings Bank,2 9 where a deposit of a
minor's funds under an order of the Probate Court of
Cook County was accepted by a bank, a preferred claim
was allowed by the court with priority in payment over
the claims of all general creditors. In that case the bank
sought to avoid the claim for preference by showing that
it had not been qualified under the Trust Companies
Act,30 but the court held that the bank did not have the
power to defeat the purpose of the statute and cause the
deposit to become a general one, either by bookkeeping
methods or otherwise, even though the trustee made no
objection to the methods employed by the bank in han-
dling the transaction, because the bank was charged with
28 96 I1. 612 (1880).
29 272 IM. App. 444 (1933).
80 IM. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 32, par. 345 et seq.
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knowledge of the source of the fund and also with knowl-
edge that the deposit was being made in accordance with
the Trust Companies Act. On that point, the court said:
The bank had knowledge of the character of the deposit and the
purpose for which it was made, and is chargeable with knowledge
of the statute governing the deposit, and, as it had not qualified
under the act, the receipt of the deposit under such circumstances
was unlawful. Where a deposit itself is unlawful, it constitutes
a trust and not a general deposit, and upon the insolvency of the
bank a preferred claim will be allowed.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
Where money or property has been wrongfully, unlaw-
fully or fraudulently obtained by a bank, the owner of
the money or property so obtained is entitled to a pre-
ferred claim against the said bank in the event of its
insolvency based on that money or the value of that prop-
erty. The theory upon which such claim is allowed is
that by its conduct the bank became a constructive trustee
or a trustee ex maleficio. 1 So also where a judgment
based on fraud and deceit has been previously obtained
against a bank, the judgment creditor thereunder is en-
titled to a preferred claim against the balk, because the
rendition of the judgment created a trust in favor of the
customer who had been defrauded, but every demand
which grows out of a fraudulent transaction perpetrated
by an officer of a bank will not, ordinarily, give the
creditor presenting such claim any preference.32
In the case of People v. American Trust and Savings
Bank of Kankakee,3 in which case a preferred claim
based on a judgment for fraud and deceit was allowed,
the court said:
Fraud and deceit by the bank, whereby the bank obtains money
of the customer, creates a trust in favor of the customer.
81 People ex rel. Nelson v. State Bank of Maywood, 354 Ill. 519, 188
N. E. 853 (1933) ; People v. Citizens State Bank, 274 Ill. App. 444 (1934).32 Michie on Banks and Banking, sec. 174; Bluefield Nat. Bank v. Pickle-
simer, 102 W. Va. 128, 135 S. E. 257 (1926).
33 262 Ill. App. 458 (1931).
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A constructive trust is held to be where one clothed with some
fiduciary character, by fraud or otherwise, gains something for
himself which equity will fasten upon his conscience, converting
him into a trustee of legal title. To raise a constructive trust
there must be some element of fraud at the time of the transac-
tion, or a confidential relation and influence whereby one ob-
tained legal title to property which he ought not, according to the
rules of equity and in good conscience, to hold and enjoy.
Streeter v. Gamble, 298 Ill. 332.
A constructive trust is raised also where moneys are
delivered to a bank for a specific purpose, such as for the
purchase of particular securities and the bank fails to
make such purchase or misappropriates the funds in any
way. In the case of Nelson v. John B. Colgrove & Com-
pany State Bank,3 4 which was a consolidation of a num-
ber of similar claims, one Margaret Schuessler delivered
to one Gallogher, as cashier of said bank, the sum of
four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) for the purchase of
6 per cent City Warrants, which she never received, al-
though interest thereon was duly paid every six months.
Upon the closing of the bank, a note for four thousand
seventy-three dollars ($4,073.00), bearing interest at the
rate of 6 per cent per annum, was found in an envelope
bearing an endorsement of Mrs. Schuessler's name, and
the court, in allowing a preferred claim to Mrs. Schuess-
ler, said:
It is claimed that the money was placed with the other funds of
the bank and used by the bank in its business and therefore its
identity had been destroyed. It is the identity of the fund, and
not the identity of the money or currency, which is to be estab-
lished. As stated before, this money never was deposited to the
claimant's account in the bank or given to the bank for that
purpose but only for the specific purpose of purchasing said war-
rants and the receipt given for it conclusively impresses it with
a trust.
This rule, however, does not apply where moneys are
turned over to the bank merely for investment, with-
84 270 Ill. App. 411 (1933).
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out any specific instructions as to the nature or type of
investment to be made, and the bank purchases securities
which subsequently become worthless, since, in such case,
the bank has done all that it was requested to do. In the
Colgrove Bank case the court, in discussing a deposit of
one Minnie Waggoner for investment in "customer's
loans" and her claim for a preference based on the fact
that some of the notes contained in an envelope bearing an
endorsement of her name, which had been delivered to
her upon the closing of the bank, were worthless, said:
The fact that one of the notes was uncollectible would not im-
press the whole transaction with a trust or even a general claim
against the bank, as we do not understand the law to be that if
a person asks a bank to invest his money in the purchase of
securities and the bank does so in accordance with the request,
the mere fact that one or more of the securities may have become
uncollectible when the bank became insolvent, would establish a
claim against the bank, either general or preferred.
When a bank accepts a deposit which it has no legal
right to accept, a constructive trust is raised in favor of
the rightful owner of the fund. This doctrine was fully
discussed in the case of People v. The Peoples State Bank
of Maywood, 5 wherein the bank accepted deposits of vil-
lage funds in excess of its indemnifying bond to the
village board, the acceptance of such deposits being in
violation of a village ordinance of which the bank was
charged with knowledge, because it had furnished in-
demnity bonds to the village thereunder. In that case the
court said:
The omission to observe a mandatory provision of a statute or
ordinance renders unlawful the act or proceeding which it gov-
erns or to which it relates. (People v. Graham, 267 Ill. 426.)
A deposit is wrongful and unlawful when made by the custodian
of public funds in a bank which, owing to its failure to furnish
the bond of indemnity required by an ordinance passed pursuant
to statutory authority, is not qualified to receive the deposit.
Likewise, a deposit of public funds in excess of the penalty of the
35 354 Il. 519, 188 N. E. 853 (1933).
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bond of indemnity given by a qualified depositary, when pro-
hibited by statute or authorized ordinance is, as to such excess,
wrongful and unlawful. The receipt of such funds, in either
of these situations, the officers of the bank having knowledge of
the illegality of the deposit, does not give rise to the relation
of debtor and creditor. Such funds, deposited in violation of law,
*do not become assets of the bank, but are impressed with a con-
structive trust.
CHECKS AND DRAFTS
As has been said before, the generally accepted theory
of a deposit of money in a bank is that the relation of
debtor and creditor is created between the bank and the
depositor and that that relation continues as to the
deposit in the absence of special circumstances altering or
changing the relationship.
Prior to 1931 frequent attempts were made to establish
a claim for preference based on the purchase of a cer-
tified or cashier's check or draft by a depositor, but such
claims were always held to be based on a mere purchase
of the bank's credit and-entitled to no preference.
In the case of Jewitt v. Yardley,36 it was held that
where a depositor in a bank obtains from it two drafts
upon another bank, paying therefor by checks against his
deposit, the relation between the bank and the depositor
with respect to such drafts remains that of debtor and
creditor, and is not changed to a fiduciary relation, en-
titling the depositor, upon the bank becoming insolvent
before the drafts are paid, to have the assets in the hands
of its receiver applied by preference to the payment of
such drafts in full.
A similar rule was applied in Illinois"7 prior to July
8, 1931, on which date the Legislature passed "An Act
defining the relations between banks and their depositors
36 81 F. 920 (1897).
37 Clark v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 186 Ill. 440, 57 N. E. 1061
(1900) ; People ex rel. Nelson v. Builders & Merchants Bank, 264 11. App.
388 (1932).
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with respect to the deposit and collection of checks and
other instruments payable in money. "38 Paragraph 2 of
section 13 of that act provides that when a drawee or
payor bank has presented to it for payment an item or
items drawn upon or payable by or at such bank and at
the time has on deposit to the credit of the maker or
drawer an amount equal to such item or items and such
drawee or payor shall fail or close for business, after
having charged such item or items to the account of the
maker or drawer thereof, the assets of such drawee or
payor shall be impressed with a trust in favor of the
owner or owners of such item or items for the amount
thereof, and such owner or owners shall be entitled to a
preferred claim upon such assets, irrespective of whether
the fund representing such item or items can be traced
and identified as part of such assets or has been inter-
mingled with or converted into such other assets of such
failed bank.
The constitutionality of that provision was presented
for the consideration of the Supreme Court of Illinois in
the case of cQee v. Randall." in which case McQueen
sought a preferred claim for the amount of certain cer-
tified checks which he had purchased for the purpose of
forwarding them with certain bids for government
work which he had prepared in connection with his em-
ployment as a contractor and which were subsequently
returned to him by the government upon the awarding
of the contract to some other contractor. The receiver
of the bank from which McQueen had purchased the
checks refused to recognize them, and on McQueen's in-
tervening petition for a preference, he attacked the con-
stitutionality of paragraph 2 of section 13 of the Act of
1931 on the ground,'that it was an amendment to the
Banking Act and had not been submitted to a vote of the
38 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 16a, pars. 25-39.
89 353 I11. 231, 187 N. E. 286 (1933).
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People as required by section 5 of Article XI of the Con-
stitution of 1870. The court held, however, that the Act
of 1931 only changed the time respecting the deposit and
collection of instruments payable in money when the
bank gains title to the proceeds of such instruments, and,
therefore, it was not violative of any constitutional pro-
vision requiring that amendments to the Banking Act be
presented to the People for approval.
The constitutionality of the Act of 1931 was again
raised in the case of People v. Dennhardt,40 but the
Supreme Court held that the law as laid down in the case
of McQueen v. Randall, was decisive on the question of
constitutionality and allowed a preferred claim based on
a draft for which Dennhardt sought a preference. In its
decision of the case, the court said:
By charging the drawer's account with the amount of the check
or instrument presented, that amount is in effect taken from his
account and held in trust by the bank for the legal holder of the
check or other instrument.
The foregoing Bank Collection Code, however, was
further, and more successfully, attacked on the point of
constitutionality in the case of People ex rel. Barret v.
The Union Bank and Trust Company, 1 wherein the
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a decision handed
down in the Circuit Court of Stephenson County declar-
ing section 13 of the Act of 1931 to be invalid. In this
case, the receiver of the First National Bank of Freeport
sought a preference on account of a draft drawn to its
order on The Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Company of Chicago by the Union Bank and Trust
Company in payment of a balance due for clearings be-
tween the two banks. The Union Bank was declared in-
solvent before the draft had an opportunity to clear and
the receiver of the Union Bank moved to strike the peti-
40 354 1M. 450, 188 N. E. 464 (1933).
41 362 Ill. 164, 199 N. E. 272 (1935).
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tion for preference on the ground that section 13 of the
Bank Collection Code was unconstitutional because it
sought to control the distribution of the assets of in-
solvent national banks in violation of the enactments of
Congress42 and the decisions of the Supreme Court.4 The
claim for preference was denied and the circuit court
held that section 13 of the Act of 1931 was unconstitu-
tional.
On appeal some question was raised as to the propriety
of an attack being made on the constitutionality of the
aforementioned act by the receiver of a state bank, the
contention being that the question could be raised only by
a receiver of a national bank, but the court declined to
entertain the objection and was of the opinion that the
receiver of a state bank had such an interest in the ques-
tion of the validity of the statute as would entitle him to
present the point for consideration.
The court was also of the opinion that the Legislature
in passing the Act of 1931, better known as the Bank
Collection Code, intended that it would apply to state and
national banks alike, and that a declaration as to the
invalidity of section 13 alone would alter the Act to such
an extent as to change the intent of the Legislature in
passing the statute. It was, therefore, decided that, inas-
much as the plan of the Legislature in enacting the Code
would be destroyed by declaring a portion of the Code
illegal, the entire Bank Collection Code would have to
be declared to be unconstitutional.
COLLECTION ITEMS
It is held that the insolvency of a bank at once ter-
minates its authority to proceed further, and if collec-
42 U. S. C. A., Tit. 12, Banks and Banking, sec. 194.
43 Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 40 L. Ed. 700 (1896)
Cook County Nat. Bank v. U. S., 107 U. S. 445, 27 L. Ed. 537 (1883) ; Old
Companies Lehigh, Inc. v. Meeker, 71 F. (2d) 280 (1934) ; National Bank of
America et al. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 71 F. (2d) 618
(1934).
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tions are afterwards made or those previously under-
taken are completed, the proceeds are held in trust for
the owners. 4  In Illinois this matter was governed
by statute" and insolvent banks were specifically re-
quired to return with reasonable diligence any and all
items mailed to them or entrusted to them for collection
or payment but before the collection thereof. This stat-
ute also impressed the assets of the collecting bank with
a trust in favor of the owner of such items if collected
and if the bank became insolvent before remittance to
the owner; and the statute gave the said owner a pre-
ferred claim against the assets of such bank, regardless
of whether the fund representing the items could or could
not be traced into said assets. But the statute referred
to was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
Illinois in the Union Bank case, just discussed.
In forwarding checks for collection and remittance,
it has been frequently held that the relation of debtor and
creditor is not thereby established, and inasmuch as it
would be a manifest fraud upon the party forwarding
the collection item if the collecting bank were permitted
to appropriate the proceeds thereof, a trust has been held
to attach thereto.
In the case of Nelson v. John B. Colgrove & Company
State Bank,46 on an appeal from a decree of the Circuit
Court of Christian County allowing a preference to the
claim of Moore-Lowry Flour Mills Company, based on a
certificate of deposit which failed to go through the clear-
ing house before the closing of the Colgrove Bank, the
court said:
It has been held by all the courts of this State which have
passed upon the question that where an account has been sent to
a bank with instructions simply to collect, the collection of the
44 7 C. J. 625, sec. 301.
45 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 16a, par. 37.
46 268 Ill. App. 49 (1932).
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fund establishes the relation of debtor and creditor only between
the parties, but when the paper is sent with express instructions
to collect and remit, then the money when collected by the bank
becomes a trust fund. People v. Iuka State Bank, 229 Ill. App. 4;
Bates v. People ex rel. Nelson, 265 Ill. App. 1.
In the case of People v. Auburn State Bank,47 it was
held that where a draft is forwarded for collection and
remittance, and the collection is made, the proceeds be-
come a trust fund for the benefit of the forwarder. And
in the case of People ex rel Nelson v. The Peoples Bank
and Trust Company of Rockford,41 in allowing a pre-
ferred claim based on a check for $10,000 which had failed
to clear before the closing of the defendant bank by the
Auditor of Public Accounts, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois cited the decision in the case of Skinner v. Porter,9
wherein it was said:
It is quite generally held that when a bank receives paper for
collection and remittance from a stranger, who is not a depositor
of the collecting bank or between whom there are no reciprocal
accounts, and accepts in payment a check or checks drawn upon
itself, a trust fund in favor of the drawer or forwarding bank
is thereby created, which fund may be followed and recovered
from the ru--che __ b_-__V- ank ifth latterc al eu~v receivro assignere said b .. if .. cr s- a' 1
come insolvent.
It was also held by the Supreme Court of Illinois in
the case of People ex rel. Nelson v. The Peoples Bank and
Trust Company of Rockford, that bookkeeping entries
may constitute a sufficient res upon which a trust may
operate.50 And it has been held that a demand by a
depositor in a bank for the amount of his deposit and
the refusal by the bank to comply with that demand cre-
47 215 Ill. App. 133 (1919).
48 353 Ill. 479, 187 N. E. 522 (1933).
49 45 Ida. 530, 263 P. 993 (1928). See also, In re Citizens' State Bank,
44 Ida. 33, 255 P. 300 (1927) ; National Bank of the Republic v. Porter, 44
Ida. 514, 258 P. 544 (1927).
50 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204
P. 992, 21 A. L. R. 677 (1921) ; Washbon v. Linscott State Bank, 87 Kan.
698, 125 P. 17 (1912).
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ates a trust in favor of the depositor.5' This holding is
based on the theory that a bank holds the money of its
depositors subject to demand, but it must appear that
the bank was solvent at the time of the said demand and
able to pay the same, and where the money to pay a de-
mand is partly counted out at the time the bank is taken
over by the Auditor of Public Accounts or some other
duly constituted official, the relation of debtor and cred-
itor has not been changed to one of trust so as to create
a trust in favor of the depositor in the assets of the
said bank.52
VETERANS' CLAIMS
The law with reference to the preferred status of a
claim for moneys paid to a war veteran or his guardian,
conservator, or beneficiary has been rather well settled
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Spicer v. Smith,53 wherein the guardian of a mentally
incompetent war veteran sought a preferred claim for
the amount of his ward's deposit in an insolvent bank on
the ground that the proceeds of said deposit were the
property of the United States and as such entitled to
preferential treatment by the receiver. The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, in which state the cause of action
arose, in the case of Smith v. Spicer's Guardian,54 denied
the claim for preference and held that the deposits of the
guardian did not make the bank a debtor of the United
States. In its consideration of the case, the Supreme
Court of the United States sustained the decision of the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky and held that "payment
to the guardian vested title in the ward and operated
51 People ex rel. Nelson v. Chicago Bank of Commerce, 275 II1. App. 68
(1934) and cases cited. But see People ex rel. Nelson v. Chicago Bank of
Commerce, 282 Ill. App. 155 (1935) and People ex rel. Nelson v. First Italian
State Bank, 281 III. App. 1 (1934), where the court took a contrary view.
52 People v. Bryn Mawr State Bank, 273 Ill. App. 415 (1934).
53 288 U. S. 430, 77 L. Ed. 875 (1933).
54 244 Ky. 68, 50 S. W. (2d) 64 (1932).
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to discharge the obligation of the United States in re-
spect of such installments. ' 55 The Supreme Court also
held that the guardian was not the agent or instrumental-
ity of the United States in the performance of his
duties.5"
Prior to the decision in Spicer v. Smith, two theories
were urged in the effort to obtain preferential treatment
for deposits arising out of money paid by the United
States to its ex-soldiers on account of adjusted service
certificates or pensions. One of these theories was that
urged in Spicer v. Smith, and the other was that payment
to a guardian or other representative did not completely
discharge the obligation of the United States to the vet-
eran or his beneficiaries so that the funds deposited by a
guardian remained moneys of the United States until
actually expended for the benefit of the veteran or his
beneficiaries.5 7 However, the question appears to'have
been finally and conclusively determined, and the Appel-
late Court of Illinois in the cases of People v. Stony
Island State Bank,58 Annie Chamness, Guardian, etc. v.
James,59 and People v. First State Bank of Mineral60 has,
on the basis of the decision in Spicer v. Smith, denied a
preference to the claims in those cases in which claims
were based on pensions and adjusted service certificates.
In the case of People v. Stony Island State Bank,6
which was heard by the Supreme Court of Illinois on a
certificate of importance, after a preference had been
denied in the Appellate Court for a claim based on a
deposit constituting the proceeds of a loan on an adjusted
55 Citing Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U. S. 42, 28 L. Ed. 64 (1884); Maclay v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 152 U. S. 499, 38 L. Ed. 528 (1894).
56 Citing Shippee v. Commercial Trust Co., 115 Conn. 326, 161 A. 775
(1932) ; Puffenbarger v. Charter, 112 W. Va. 488, 165 S. E. 541 (1932).
57 Nelson v. John B. Colgrove & Co. State Bank, 267 Ill. App. 317 (1932).
58 272 Ill. App. 365 (1933).
59 275 Ill. App. 206 (1934).
60 275 Il1. App. 123 (1934).
61 358 Il. 118, 192 N. E. 682 (1934).
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service certificate, the Supreme Court held that not only
was the petitioner not entitled to a preference, but also
that the taking over of the assets of the bank was not a
seizure under legal or equitable process from which ad-
justed service certificates and the loans thereon are
exempt.6 2 On that point the court held:
The protection of section 618 with respect to the property defined
is afforded where the veteran is a debtor and a third person has a
claim or demand against him. Without a relationship in which
the veteran is the debtor or obligor, the section has no applica-
tion. A veteran does not, by the deposit in a bank of all or a
part of the proceeds of a loan upon his adjusted service certifi-
cate become a debtor or obligor; he becomes, on the contrary, a
creditor of the bank. Manifestly, a relationship wherein the vet-
eran is the creditor and the bank is the debtor does not enable
the bank, or, if insolvent, its receiver, to subject property of the
veteran to attachment, levy or seizure by any legal or equitable
process.08
STATE FUNDS
The right of state funds to preferential treatment finds
its origin in the English common law, and its basis is
the general principle of the common law that "where the
King's right and that of a subject meet at one and the
same time, the King's shall be preferred."64 The priority
to which the King was entitled at common law was predi-
cated upon his sovereignty and inasmuch as the State
has succeeded to that sovereignty and we have adopted
the common law, the State is entitled to the rights inci-
dent to sovereignty. The right is likewise founded on
public policy since a sovereign has an inherent right to
have its revenue protected so that it may be adequate
62 36 U. S. C. A. 618.
63 Citing Mobley v. Jackson, 171 Ga. 434, 156 S. E. 23 (1930) ; Andrew v.
Colorado Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 872, 219 N. W. 62 (1928); Reichert v.
Berlin State Bank, 265 Mich. 150, 251 N. W. 340 (1933) ; State v. Bank of
Bristol, 165 Tenn. 461, 55 S. W. (2d) 771 (1933); Shaw v. Williams, 60
S. W. (2d) 1073 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933); Burke v. Shaw, 63 S. W. (2d)
1117 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933).
64 8 Bacon's Abridgment 91.
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to sustain the public burdens and discharge public debts,
and it is the duty of the courts to preserve and protect
it in the absence of statutory provision evincing a legis-
lative intent to abandon, repeal, or waive the right. How-
ever, the right of priority exists only in favor of the
State as a single and indivisible unit, and does not exist
in favor of the various subdivisions of the State through
which a great deal of the actual work of administration
is done. It follows, therefore, that only so long as the
funds belonging to the State, which are usually in the
form of tax moneys of one type or another, remain undis-
tributed are they entitled to any preferential treatment
as a claim against an insolvent bank.
The case of People v. Farmers State Bank"" is au-
thority for the proposition that money which has been
paid and collected for taxes is the property of the State
until it is distributed to the various municipalities and
particular subdivisions entitled thereto. However, if a
particular county collector has already paid over the
moneys due to the various county subdivisions which are
entitled to share iMi its revenue, so that the remainder on
deposit to the credit of the county collector in a closed
bank will necessarily be turned over to the county, that
fact would not deprive the State of a prior claim before
that remainder is actually transferred by the county col-
lector to himself as county treasurer (who is ex officio
county collector) e
The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, has stead-
fastly refused to extend the doctrine of the priority of
public funds to make it apply to tax money or alleged
public funds after they have been allotted or delivered to
the various municipalities or political subdivisions en-
65 335 Ill. 617, 167 N. E. 804 (1929).
66 People v. West Englewood Trust & Savings Bank, 353 11. 451, 187 N.
E. 525 (1933)
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titled thereto. In the case of People v. Ohle,67 the court
said:
Priority as to public moneys deposited exists only in favor of
,the State as an entire and indivisible sovereignty and does not
extend to the various political subdivisions or agencies through
which the State functions.
In accordance with that decision the Supreme Court
has consistently refused to allow priority to school dis-
trict funds,"8 general county funds, 9 sheriff's fees,70 and
road and bridge funds,71 as well as many other particular
funds which have been distributed to the various munici-
palities and political subdivisions in order to meet their
financial obligations and the expenses of the administra-
tion of their affairs.
In the case of People v. Seward State Bank,7 the town-
ship treasurer of Township 26 sought to protect himself
from liability by having his account designated as a
"Special Trustee Account" and marked "Special" on
the books and records of his bank and further by execut-
ing an agreement with the cashier of the bank, who was
acting under authority vested in him by the Board of
Directors of the institution, containing special provi-
sions as to the special character of his account, but the
court saw fit to disregard his numerous precautions and
look behind the careful designations to the actual han-
dling of the account, which, as a matter of fact, was no
different from the handling of any other general account
of the bank. The court held that in order to deserve
preferential treatment the situation must exist in just
the way that it is purported to exist, and, in accordance
67 345 Ill. 405, 178 N. E. 163 (1931).
68 People v. Farmers State Bank, 338 Il. 134, 170 N. E. 236 (1930) ; Peo-
ple v. Ohle, 345 Ill. 405, 178 N. E. 163 (1931).
69 People v. Bank of Chebanse, 340 Ill. 124, 172 N. E. 50 (1930) ; People
v. Dime Savings Bank et al., 350 Ill. 503, 183 N. E. 604 (1932).
70 People v. Waukegan State Bank, 351 Ill. 158, 184 N. E. 237 (1933).
71 People 'v. Home State Bank, 338 Ill. 179, 170 N. E. 205 (1930).
72 268 Ill. App. 32 (1932).
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with the established rule in Illinois, also held that the
official capacity of the depositor did not entitle him to
any preference despite the fact that such deposits were
made in such official capacity. The court held also that
the agreement which had been executed by the depositor
and the cashier of the bank was absolutely void and of
no effect since the bank had no authority to enter into a
secret agreement assuring one depositor that he would
be entitled to a preference over other depositors in case
the bank became insolvent. The court said:
Banking corporations being creatures of law possess only such
powers as are expressly granted by law or are impliedly granted
because necessary to carry out powers expressly granted, and the
making of secret agreements for the benefit or protection of one
depositor, as herein attempted, does not fall in either class.
Banks publish financial statements showing assets and liabil-
ities and public policy prevents any secret understanding or
agreement which would in any manner give one depositor an
advantage or preference over another depositor.78
Various attempts have been made from time to time
to demonstrate that the sovereign's prerogative has been
abolished by implication of law or has been lost because
of failure to assert it in proper time. In the case of
People v. West Englewood Trust and Savings Bank,
already cited, it was contended that the common law
right of the State to prior payment of its claims had been
abandoned and abrogated with the enactment of the
County Treasurer Act which relates to counties having a
population of more than 150,000.74 The act referred to
was approved in 1915 and amended in 1925, and provided
for the giving of security by banks before permitting
them to act as depositaries of state funds.
The court held that although depositary acts have been
held to have abrogated the State's prerogative to prior
3 See Commercial Banking and Trust Co. v. Citizens Trust and Guar-
anty Co. of West Virginia, 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.)
950 (1913).
74 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 36.
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payment in some states, namely, Texas,75 Arkansas,76
Utah,77 Wyoming, 78 Missouri,19 and Arizona, 0 it was of
the opinion that no repeal was effected by the depositary
law of Illinois because the act was silent on that point
and the repeal of laws by implication is not favored when
the laws effect the citizens of the State or the sovereign
power of the State and especially when they affect the
sovereign power. The court also held that if it had been
the intention of the Legislature to abolish the common
law method of protecting public revenues, it would have
said so specifically.81
In the case of People v. The Waukegan State Bank et
al., 2 it was contended that the State's claim for priority
should have been asserted before the appointment of the
receiver and that by failing to claim that priority the
State had forfeited its right thereto, that right being
extinguished by the appointment and confirmation of the
receiver. This contention was based on the theory that
because the amendment of section 2 of the Banking Act
in 1929 vested the title to the assets of the bank in the
receiver "for the purpose of the receivership, 83 the
State has no right to assert its prerogative after a re-
ceiver has been appointed and his appointment confirmed.
The court held:
75 Shaw v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 48 S. W. (2d) 974
(Tex. Com. App., 1932).
76 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 173 Ark. 103, 291 S. E. 1003
(1927).
77 National Surety Co. v. Pixtor, 60 Utah 289, 208 P. 878 (1922).
78 National Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134, 241 P. 1063 (1925).
79 In re Holland Banking Co., 313 Mo. 307, 281 S. W. 702 (1926).
80 In re Central Bank of Wilcox, 23 Ariz. 574, 205 P. 915 (1922).
81 See Booth v. State of Georgia, 131 Ga. 750, 63 S. E. 502 (1908) ; State
ex rel. Rankin v. Madison State Bank of Virginia City, 68 Mont. 342, 218 P.
652 (1923); Maryland Casualty Co. v. McConnell, 148 Tenn. 656, 257 S. W.
410 (1924); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Bramwell, 108
Ore. 261, 217 P. 332 (1923) ; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Cen-
tral Trust Co., 95 W. Va. 458, 121 S. E. 430 (1924) ; American Bonding Co.
of Baltimore v. Reynolds, 203 F. 356 (1913); In re Carnegie Trust Co., 206
N. Y. 390, 99 N. W. 1096 (1912).
82 351 Ill. 548, 184 N. E. 237 (1932).
83 Il1. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 16a, par. 11.
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The amendment of 1929 was not intended to destroy the State's
prerogative or make it ineffective after the appointment of a re-
ceiver. There was no purpose, desirable to the State, to relin-
quish such a valuable right, and it is well settled that the rights
of a sovereign are never impaired by a legislative enactment
unless such an intention is expressly declared in the statute.
In the case of People v. The Marion Trust and Savings
Bank,4 a similar contention to the effect that the failure
of the State to claim its priority before the appointment
of the receiver was a waiver thereof was raised, but the
court was of the opinion that a legislative enactment
would be necessary to abrogate such a valuable right of
the State.8 5
The claim of the State for priority, however, is not con-
fined to deposits in the insolvent banks, but extends to
taxes and other charges due therefrom as well, and in the
case of People v. The Bank of Rushville,"8 the court said:
A claim for taxes is entitled to priority over individual debts.
Taxes are levied for the support of the government and take
precedence over all other demands against the property owner.
The property of the owner may be seized and sold though there
may be other liens upon it. Payment of taxes may be enforced
to the exclusion of all other creditors.
A preference based on a state claim was also allowed
in the case of People ex rel. Barrett v. The Peoples Sav-
ings Bank and Trust Company, 7 wherein the East Moline
State Hospital claimed a preference for a deposit made
up of operating funds, profits from the operation of the
commissary which was designated as an amusement fund
84 347 Ill. 445, 179 N. E. 893 (1932).
. See American Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. Reynolds, 203 F. 356
(1913); Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380, 41 S. Ct. 143, 65 L. Ed. 315(1920); State Bank of Commerce v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 28 S. W. (2d) 184 (Tex. Civ. Ct. of App., 1930); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. McConnell, 148 Tenn. 656, 257 S. W. 410 (1924); United States
.Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Central Trust Co., 95 W. Va. 458, 121 S. E.
430 (1924); Denver v. Stenger, 295 F. 809 (1924); Fidelity and Deposit
Co. v. McClintock, 68 Mont. 342, 218 P. 652 (1923).
86 355 Ill. 336, 189 N. E. 299 (1934).
87 362 Ill. 395, 199 N. E. 824 (1935).
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and various sums deposited with the hospital for the use
and comfort of various patients of the hospital, both
past and present. Statutory provision has been made
for the disposition of the profits from the commissary
operation and the funds left from the deposits for the
benefit and comfort of former patients. 8
The Supreme Court allowed the preference and held
that the maintenance of a hospital for the insane was a
governmental function and, as such, deposits of funds to
be used in its operation were state funds. The court also
held that the preference extended to the entire fund
regardless of its source and the purposes for which it
was intended.8 9
As to the class of trust funds not created by an express
agreement or arrangement, it would seem to follow that
their right to a preference is dependent, first, upon bring-
ing them within one of the classes wherein they will be
treated as trust funds because of the circumstances sur-
rounding the deposits and, second, in tracing the pro-
ceeds of the trust funds into the hands of the receiver,
except as to funds granted a statutory priority, where
no tracing is necessary.
88 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 23, par. 25.
89 University of Tennessee v. Peoples Bank, 157 Tenn. 87, 6 S. W. (2d)
328 (1928) ; In re Blalock, 31 F. (2d) 612 (1929).
